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Executive Summary
This analysis provides policymakers in Georgia with information about the feasibility and
implications of a Premium Assistance program, under which a portion of PeachCare dollars
would be used to pay employee contributions for employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) for
some PeachCare eligible children. These children and their families would then have coverage
through a private rather than public plan. We use data from multiple sources to estimate the
share of those children and families who were enrolled in PeachCare for Kids in 2003 who
potentially have access to employer sponsored plans, their likely take-up rate for such a program,
the expansion of private coverage that would occur, and the potential increased cost to the state
as income-eligible families currently paying for private coverage qualify for the Premium
assistance program.
We use data from 2003 for this initial estimate of cost and take up for premium assistance in
Georgia. As the enrollment file available for this analysis is comprised of participants and their
parents who applied for coverage during 2003, we use premium and cost information from 2003
to generate the estimates of participation. Further, the estimates of participation that we model
depend heavily on estimates of the likely response to a change in price (price elasticity). These
price elasticity estimates are found in the literature and are determined by studies of populations
that are quite different from the PeachCare population. Therefore, we view these estimates as
preliminary and plan to revise them when accurate eligibility files and claims data for 2004 can
be obtained. From the 2004 eligibility file, we can calculate the response of the PeachCare
population to the change in premium introduced in July 2004 so that our estimated price
elasticity will be derived from the same sample as used in the analysis. Furthermore, the cost per
participant and employer premium information will be in 2004 dollars.
We estimate that of the 251,000 children enrolled in PeachCare for all or part of 2003, at most
125,000 (or 49 percent) are eligible for an employer-sponsored health benefit program. Given a
cost neutrality assumption and the 2003 PeachCare per member per month expenditures of $111
per enrolled child, we assume a maximum potential ESI supplement of $111 per child in each
eligible family and a maximum of three eligible children in each family. We estimate take-up
rates that vary between 6,000 and 45,000 children, with a mid-range estimate of 26,000, or ten
percent of all PeachCare children. We also estimate that for each of the children transitioned
from public to private coverage, one additional family member would gain coverage.
Furthermore, we estimate that between 1,000 and 5,000 currently uninsured children with
PeachCare eligibility would participate in a premium assistance program. However, it is likely
that there would be some ‘crowd in’ of publicly subsidized private coverage. We estimate that
without any change in the current look-back for private coverage, at most 8 percent of the
families of the 350,000 children in this income range that are now privately insured would
transition to premium assistance, for an added programmatic cost of about 11 million dollars to
the state.
Drawing on examples from other states, we describe the implications of mandatory, rather than
voluntary, enrollment and estimate the reach of a mandatory program based on the experience of
4 other states that have implemented such programs. We further discuss the need for the state to
consider several administrative issues that would be associated with a premium assistance
program.
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The potential for premium assistance programs to simultaneously shore up the employersponsored market, provide a single source of continuous coverage for low and moderate income
families, save the state (and federal government) money, and reduce the number of uninsured
appears limited. Each of these policy goals might be achievable through a premium assistance
program, but not all of them would be simultaneously achievable, as each goal has different
implications for how such a program would be designed and implemented. Before forging ahead
with such a program, the state would need to prioritize these goals so that the design and
administration would reflect the priorities of policymakers.
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Rationale for Study
This analysis provides policymakers in Georgia with information about the feasibility and
implications of a premium assistance program, under which a portion of PeachCare dollars
would be used to purchase employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) for some children rather
than to provide direct care through the public sector. A premium assistance program could have
several potential benefits to the enrolled populations and to the state.
For enrollees, coverage through employment-based plans would likely improve continuity of
coverage by reducing the potential for late or non-payment of premiums to disrupt coverage.
Furthermore, there is evidence that families with multiple sources of coverage are inefficient
users of the child’s coverage when compared to children in which all family members are
covered under the same program. Finally, family coverage would include parents of covered
children, some of whom are likely foregoing coverage while their children are enrolled in
PeachCare for Kids.
For Georgia, such a program can leverage state dollars with employer and employee
contributions to garner coverage for entire families. If uninsured parents are receiving care at all,
such care is likely reported as uncompensated care and partially funded through the
Disproportionate Share Hospital program with state and federal dollars. In addition, there is
substantial evidence of the need to shore up employment-based coverage, particularly among
low wage workers and workers at small to mid-sized firms. If a premium assistance program
increases enrollment in and demand for ESI, this may have the secondary effect of expanding
such plans for other non-qualified workers.
This document first provides background statistics on the children enrolled in PeachCare and the
sources of income available in their families, followed by a description of the Georgia labor
market and the characteristics of the firms at which PeachCare parents work. We then provide
an estimate of the number of PeachCare children with employed parents working at firms that
offer health insurance, the likely coverage eligibility of those children, and a range of estimates
of take up of ESI that might be expected given a subsidy based on the current per-member permonth cost. Finally, we discuss the potential for crowd-in to increase the cost of a premium
assistance program and several alternative premium assistance program structures that might be
considered, depending upon policy goals.
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Background and Descriptive Statistics
PeachCare Children
During calendar year 2003, a total of 379,600 children were enrolled in either PeachCare or
PeachCare Plus for one or more months. All of these children had applied for coverage through
the PeachCare system. The total eligibility months (combined for PeachCare and PeachCare
Plus) for these children are shown below.
Table 1
Eligibility in Months
Children

Percent of Total

35,020
97,997
246,583
379,600

Less than 6 months
6 to 11 months
Full Year
Total Children

9%
26%
65%

The mean number of months enrolled for all children is 10.5, with the majority of children
enrolled for the entire calendar year. Almost 15 percent of these children (almost 56,000 children)
had eligibility for both PeachCare and PeachCare Plus during the year. Many of these (20
percent or 11,000) were likely dually enrolled because of aging out of PeachCare Plus (ages one
and six at year end), but over 44,000 moved between the programs for reasons other than the
eligibility changes that come with attaining ages one or six1.
For purposes of the remaining evaluation, we only consider those children with at least one
month of PeachCare eligibility. Although many of the PeachCare Plus children have a working
parent and potential access to ESI, inclusion of these children would mandate that the program
be administered under Medicaid Health Insurance Premium Payment (HIPP). Analysis of such a
program would require obtaining information about all of the Medicaid eligible children, not just
those obtaining coverage because of their application for PeachCare.
The tables below describe the 251,000 children from over 157,000 families who were enrolled
for at least one month in PeachCare during 2003.
Table 2
Location
Children
Atlanta
Other MSA
Rural Georgia

117,650
30,213
102,950

1

Percent of
Total
47%
12%
41%

That is, over 44 thousand children live in families with income fluctuations such that their eligibility moves from
Medicaid to PeachCare or from PeachCare to Medicaid. This group of children comprises over 17 percent of the
total PeachCare enrollees.

5

Enrollment in PeachCare for Kids mirrors the distribution of the population in Georgia. Rural
Georgians comprise 38 percent of the total population, while metropolitan Atlanta residents
comprise 49 percent of the total population.
Table 3
Monthly Family Income
Children Percent of Total
Below $500
>$500 to $1200
>$1201 to $1725
>$1726 to $2400
>$2401 to $3100
>$3100

11,144
17,730
57,675
82,719
55,159
26,469

4%
7%
23%
33%
22%
11%

The mean monthly family income of these children ($2,225) is well below the mean family
income for all children in Georgia ($5,146) as measured by the Current Population Survey (CPS)
for calendar year 2003. Over one-third of the children enrolled in PeachCare live in families
with monthly family income below $1,725 and over two-thirds live in families with monthly
incomes below $2,400. Statewide, less than one-third of all children live in families with
monthly incomes below $2,560.
Table 4
Family Size
Children
1 child
2 children
3 children
4 or more children

76,941
102,185
51,613
20,157

Percent of
Total
31%
41%
21%
8%

PeachCare families are slightly smaller than all families with children in Georgia as measured by
the CPS. Among all families with children in Georgia, 25 percent have only one child age 18 or
younger and 10.5 percent have 4 or more children ages 18 and under. As shown above, 31
percent of PeachCare families have only one child age 18 or younger and only 8 percent have 4
or more children in this age range.
PeachCare Parents
A separate file provides information about the parents of the children who are enrolled in public
coverage through PeachCare or PeachCare Plus. There are 214,605 unique families represented
in the parent file. We have data on a total of 355,580 unduplicated sources of income for these
214,506 families. Of these sources of income, 227,369 are income related to employment.
When we eliminate the parental records for those children only eligible for PeachCare Plus, we
retain information from almost 158,000 families with almost 264,000 sources of reported income.
The table below describes the sources of income reported per family.
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Table 5
Source of Income

None
8%
76%
99%
97%
96%
75%

Employment
Child Support
Social Security
Unemployment / Worker Compensation
Other Income
Child Care (Out-flow)

Two or
More

One
74%
21%
1%
3%
4%
22%

18%
3%
0%
0%
0%
3%

Total
Families
157,518

About eight percent of the families granted coverage for children under the PeachCare for Kids
program have no source of income related to employment, almost 75 percent have a single
source of employment related income, and almost 18 percent report more than one source of
employment related income.
The table below describes the income reported for the almost 172,000 work-related sources of
income associated with families of PeachCare enrollees. The third column in the table translates
the reported income into an annual income assuming full-time employment. It is important to
note that the data provided for this analysis did not provide a measure of hours, days, or weeks
worked, so the estimate of annual income should be seen as the upper limit if the employment is
full time.
Table 6
Frequency of
Reported Income
Hourly
Weekly
Bi-weekly
Semi Monthly
Monthly
Annual

Mean Income
$
$
$
$
$
$

Mean Annual Estimate Share of Records

11
414
980
962
1,637
25,716

$
$
$
$
$
$

21,453
20,702
24,502
23,093
19,644
25,716

4%
45%
25%
2%
16%
8%

Among all working parents of PeachCare children, those reporting income based on a monthly
total appear to earn the least and those reporting income based on an annual salary the most, yet
all of the reported incomes are below average for the state. While mean annual income for all
private sector workers in the state is just over $35,000, over 95 percent of the employmentrelated sources of income have an estimated annual upper limit income of $35,000 or less, and
50 percent of these sources of employment-related income have an estimated annual upper limit
income of $20,000 dollars or less.
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Working versus non-working families of PeachCare children
The eight percent of families with children covered under PeachCare who do not have a source
of employment-related income are only marginally different from those PeachCare families with
work-related income. Families with work-related income are significantly larger (1.7 versus 1.5
children) The calculated income as a percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) for families with
work-related income is significantly higher than for families without work-related income (157
versus 78 percent). However, annual per-child expenditures and months enrolled are not
significantly different between these two groups.
Matching working parents to employers
Parents generally report the source of their employment income by employer name. We use
those employer names to attempt to match PeachCare parents to a specific employer in our
employer data base (described below). However, some of the employer names reported cannot
be matched to an employer for the purpose of estimating the likelihood of eligibility for coverage
under a premium assistance program. Therefore, we classify our parental work records as
“matched” and “unmatched” based on our ability to identify the relevant employer for each work
record.
Employers in Georgia
There are over 4,000,000 participants in the labor force in Georgia, and over 150,000 private
sector and local public sector establishments employed almost 3.5 million workers during the last
quarter of 2003. Under a State Planning Grant for the Uninsured from the Health Services and
Resources Administration (HRSA), the State of Georgia collected information on health
insurance benefits from a representative sample of over 1,700 of these firms during late 2004.
The sample for this survey was drawn from the ES202 file. The ES202 Firm-level Employment
and Address Data is collected by the Georgia Department of Labor and compiled from the Tax
and Wage Report, which is filed quarterly by each Georgia employer covered by unemployment
insurance legislation. The ES202 file contains a field for the firm’s trade name and another field
for the corporate and legal name. In addition to the firm’s names, the ES202 file provides
valuable information about the characteristics of the employer that influence the likelihood an
employer offers health insurance benefits, such as firm size, average wages, and industry. Using
the responses from the survey, we are able to estimate the likelihood that each of the ES202
firms offers health insurance and the likely cost of that coverage for individual and family plans.
Of Georgia’s 151,000 establishments, 57 percent offered at least one health insurance plan to at
least some employees during the latter part of 2004. This is down from 60 percent in 2002. As
in 2002, it remains true that firm size is the most important predictor of whether or not an
establishment offers health insurance to at least some of its employees. While 34 percent of
Georgia’s smallest establishments (those with fewer than 10 employees) offered a plan in 2004,
almost all of Georgia’s firms with 100 or more employees offer at least one plan. Offer rates
remain essentially unchanged among these largest employers in 2004. As figure 1 (below)
demonstrates, the decline in likelihood of offering coverage is most significant among the
establishments with 25 to 99 employees, declining from 82 to 68 percent in just two years.
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Figure 1
Share of Establishments Offering One or More Health Plans, 2002 and 2004
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We used the information from the 2004 employer survey to estimate the availability of ESI for
parents of PeachCare children. Parents report their employer’s name as part of the application
process for PeachCare. These names are self reported by the parents and are captured as a text
field in the parental database associated with the PeachCare plan. This self-reporting process
means that the field is not always easily matched to a corporate or legal employer name or a
trade name in the ES202 file. Fifteen different algorithms were developed to match all or part of
the name provided by parents to all or part of the trade or corporate legal name of a firm in the
ES202 file.2 We successfully matched 88,332 out of 227,000 sources of employment income to
a Georgia employer for a match rate of 42 percent. Random testing of over 1,000 matches to
ascertain the potential error rate found fewer than four percent possible errors. We limit the
matched records to parents with a child in PeachCare for a total of 64,195 sources of
employment income that can be matched to a specific Georgia employer (37 percent of all work
related income records).
Matched versus unmatched parental work records
When we compare the characteristics of those working parents whose employer was identified
with the characteristics of those whose employer was not identified, we find no significant
differences. Family size and family income for matched and unmatched parental records are
almost identical. We hypothesize, however, that the matching process was more likely to be
successful for parents working at larger firms. The evidence for and implications of this are
discussed below.
Firm Characteristics where PeachCare Parents Work
As the table below demonstrates, significantly more parents of PeachCare children work at
smaller firms than do employees in the general population. While less than 20 percent of all
Georgia workers are employed by firms with fewer than 25 employees, over 42 percent of
PeachCare parents work at these small firms.

2

Details from these algorithms are available upon request.

9

Table 7
Comparison of Firm Size:
All Georgia Workers Compared to PeachCare Parent Workers

Under 10
10 to 24
25 to 99
100-999
1000+

General
Employee
Population
9.2%
9.4%
16.9%
32.2%
32.3%

Working PeachCare
Parents - Matched
29.8%
12.4%
16.5%
22.5%
18.8%

Similarly, significantly more parents of PeachCare children work at firms that pay lower average
wages than do employees in the general population. While less than half of all workers in
Georgia are employed at firms that pay, on average, less than $2,500 per month ($30,000 per
year), almost 57 percent of all PeachCare parents who work are employed at these low-wage
firms.
Table 8
Comparison of Firm Average Monthly Wages:
All Georgia Workers Compared to Firms Employing PeachCare Parents
Average
Monthly Wages

General
Employee
Population

Working PeachCare
Parents - Matched

Under $1,000
$1,000 to $1,749
$1,750 to $2,499
$2,500 to $3,499
$3,500 to $4,999
$5,000 or higher

9.2%
16.9%
20.2%
23.7%
16.7%
13.3%

10.4%
21.8%
24.2%
21.2%
13.6%
8.1%

These characteristics help explain the fact that our upper-bound estimate of PeachCare parents
working for a firm that offers coverage is only 68.4 percent, while, across all employees in the
state, 85 percent work at a firm that offers health insurance. This estimate should be seen as an
upper bound of potential access to ESI among parents of all PeachCare children, if, as we suspect,
the matching process was more likely to be successful for large - rather than small - employers.
To test this hypothesis, we compare the firms that matched at least one PeachCare working
parent to firms with no matches in the table below.
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Table 9
Comparison of Firm Size:
Firms that Matched One or More Worker, Firms with No Matches
Number of
Workers
Under 10
10 to 24
25 to 99
100-999
1000+

Total Firms

Matched Firms

52%
15%
10%
14%
9%

20%
11%
14%
31%
25%

Non-matched
Firms
67%
17%
8%
6%
2%

Although PeachCare parents work at smaller firms to a greater extent than the general population,
the smaller firms were less likely to match a record in the data base. This is not surprising, given
the nature of the data used for this study, but, again, it suggests that our estimate of coverage
availability should be seen as an upper bound.
Working for a firm that offers coverage is no guarantee of eligibility for coverage, since workers
may be excluded from eligibility for a variety of reasons. Many firms exclude part-time workers
from eligibility for coverage. Furthermore, firms may have exclusionary periods that restrict
workers from eligibility for coverage during an initial phase of employment. Other workers are
ineligible because they are classified as temporary or seasonal workers. Across all workers in
Georgia, eligibility as a share of total workers at firms that offer coverage is almost 80 percent.
While PeachCare parents are more likely to work part-time, thus potentially reducing the share
that is eligible from the 80 percent estimate, they also work disproportionately at small firms,
which have slightly higher eligibility rates than the largest firms. Thus, we use the state average
for eligibility as a share of offer rates to derive the table below. The table shows our upper
bound estimate of PeachCare for Kids families and children with a worker at a firm that offers
coverage and our upper bound estimate of families and children eligible for that coverage based
on the data described thus far.
Table 10
Estimate of Eligibility for ESI among PeachCare Children
Totals
At least one source of employment
Estimate: Parent working where coverage offered
Estimate: Parent eligible to enroll in offered plan
Share Eligible for Coverage

Children
250,896
230,111
156,348
125,032

Families
157,518
143,045
97,814
79,025

49.8%

50.2%

Thus, we estimate that no more than half of the children enrolled in PeachCare for Kids have a
parent who is eligible for ESI coverage.3

3

These estimates are consistent with other published results: The Institute for Health Policy Solutions estimated in
2003 that just over 50 percent of children with incomes between 100 and 200 percent of FPL had access to ESI.
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Take Up Rates
Under a voluntary premium assistance program, families with children who qualify for public
coverage would be able to choose between enrolling the children in PeachCare at an income
relevant premium or using the subsidy provided by the state to enroll the family in the employer
sponsored plan at their place of employment. The likelihood that a family will choose
PeachCare for their children over participation in the ESI coverage for which they are eligible
depends in part upon the respective cost of each option. The marginal cost for those choices
changes with:
□

Potential contribution available through the premium assistance program, which we
model as a function of family size,
□ Required contributions for family and single coverage, which are dependent upon firm
size,
□ Current participation of parent in employee-only coverage, and
4
□ Current contribution levels for PeachCare participation.
In order to estimate the premium change each family will face, we make several assumptions:
1. We use the PeachCare premiums that were in effect in 2003 ($10 for a single child, $20
for two or more children over age six with family income of 150% FPL, $15 for two or
more children over age six and family income 150% FPL or lower).5 Based on the
calculated family income provided to us and 2003 federal poverty rates obtained from the
Census Bureau, we estimate that among children with working parents, 12 percent pay no
premiums, 33 percent pay premiums at the lower rate, and 55 percent pay the highest
level of premium.
2. We estimate employee share of premium for single and family coverage based on an
interpolation from the 2002 and 2004 Georgia Employer Survey. The firm size
adjustments for these contributions are obtained from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey Insurance Component (MEPS-IC). The estimated contributions for individual and
family coverage by firm size are shown in the table below.

Estimates of eligibility for ESI in Rhode Island were similar, while Colorado estimates of eligibility for ESI among
all publicly covered children (Medicaid plus S-CHIP) were somewhat lower at only 36 percent.
4
Marginal cost would also include the expected difference in cost sharing based on the plan design. For
simplification of these estimates, we assume that the higher expected out of pocket cost for co-payments and
deductibles a family might experience under ESI will be at least offset by the value of covering all family members
under a single plan, adding coverage for previously uninsured family members and a likely expansion of access to
office-based physicians.
5
Once we obtain the 2004 eligibility file, we will revise these estimates with the up-to-date premiums that are scaled
by family income up to a maximum of $70. In general, the higher PeachCare premiums will induce a slightly larger
share of the eligible families to choose ESI over remaining in PeachCare. However, the base number of enrollees
will be smaller because of the higher premiums.
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Table 13
Estimated Employee Premium Contributions
by Firm Size - 2003
Under 10
10 to 24
25 to 99
100 to 999
1000+

Single
$
$
$
$
$

Family

46.97
50.26
61.67
64.52
65.51

$
$
$
$
$

279.18
348.27
410.61
348.59
284.05

3. We assume that the per-member per-month (PMPM) ($111 for 2003) for current
PeachCare enrollees would determine the potential subsidy, with a maximum subsidy of
100 percent of the employee share for the premium or three times the PMPM for families
with three or more children.
4. We use CPS data to estimate that slightly less than 25 percent of PeachCare eligible
children have a parent currently enrolled in ESI. We assume that all of these parents are
enrolled in employee-only coverage.
Estimated Price Change for Family Coverage
All of this information is used to determine the change in the marginal contribution required for
family coverage under a premium assistance program. To clarify this, we provide an example
below for six different families: Families with one, two, or three children, and families in which
the parent has elected employee-only coverage or in which the parent remains uninsured. The
examples below assume the families have children over age six and pay PeachCare premiums at
the rate of $10 for one child and $20 for two or more children. Furthermore, the examples
assume eligibility for ESI at a firm with 25 to 99 employees, where monthly employee
contributions are $411 for family coverage and $62 for individual coverage.
Table 14

Current Monthly
Payments for
PeachCare
Coverage*

Parent Uninsured
One Child
Two Children
> Two Children
Parent Covered by ESI
One Child
Two Children
> Two Children

Potential
Premium
Assistance**

Current Marginal
Cost for ESI Family
Coverage***

New Marginal
Cost for ESI
Family
Coverage****

Percent
Change in
Price of
Family
Coverage
with
Premium
Assistance

$ 10.00
$ 20.00
$ 20.00

$ 111.00
$ 222.00
$ 333.00

$
$
$

400.61
390.61
390.61

$289.61
$168.61
$57.61

-28%
-57%
-85%

$ 71.67
$ 81.67
$ 81.67

$ 111.00
$ 222.00
$ 333.00

$
$
$

338.94
328.94
328.94

$227.94
$106.94
0

-33%
-67%
-100%

* Total PeachCare + Employee Only for ESI if relevant
** Number of Children* PMPM
*** Contribution for Family ESI less current monthly payments
**** Current Marginal Cost for ESI less premium assistance available, with maximum support = premium
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As this table demonstrates, the effect of premium assistance under this model varies substantially
between families depending upon family size and whether or not the parents have chosen to
enroll in employee only coverage when their children are covered under PeachCare.
Price Elasticity
The choice each family will make when faced with multiple coverage options at different prices
will also depend upon the estimated price elasticity of demand for coverage. Estimates of the
elasticity of take-up (or percent increase in families buying private coverage with the percent
decrease in premium) of employer-sponsored health insurance vary substantially. Recent
estimates of elasticity with respect to employee premiums have been quite low. Gruber and
Washington (2005) estimate a very small impact of premium subsidies on take-up (-0.02).
Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin estimate elasticity with respect to contributions of -0.0666, and
Cutler (2002) finds an estimated elasticity of take-up of -0.12.
On the other hand, Cutler and Reber (1998) estimate the effect of employee contribution on
health plan choice from -0.30 to -0.60. Royalty and Solomon (1999) utilized data from a single
employer in a setting where benefits are standardized and employees pay the full marginal cost
of their health plan option for both single and family level coverage. They calculate the price
elasticity based on the employee share of the premium ranging from -.44 to -.76. These higher
estimates are measured by evaluating the change in plan choice for employees who already
purchase coverage when faced with an exogenous price shock, while the lower estimates are
obtained by looking at the effect of a price change on purchase/non-purchase decision. For this
particular analysis, it is not clear whether those who have opted to cover their children through
PeachCare would behave more like those facing a choice of plans, with higher elasticity of
demand, or those choosing whether or not to purchase at all, with relatively inelastic demand.
We use the average of these estimates (-.3) to estimate take-up, then use the average of the lower
elasticity estimates (-.068) to estimate a lower bound and the average from the high elasticity
estimates (-0.52) to estimate an upper bound for take-up rates. The results are shown below:
Table 15: Estimate of Take-Up of ESI for Voluntary Premium Assistance Program
Family Size
1 Child
Monthly Subsidy
Estimated Children Eligible
Point Estimate of Take Up
Estimated Take Up (Lower Bound)
Estimated Take Up (Upper Bound)

2 Children

3 or More
Children

$ 111

$ 222

$ 333

43,725
4,965
1,125
8,607

51,164
11,851
2,686
20,541

30,144
9,153
2,075
15,866
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Total

125,033
25,969
5,886
45,013

The mid-range estimate of participation in a premium assistance program targeted at families of
PeachCare children is 25,969 children, with a range from 5,886 to 45,013 children, or between
two and 18 percent of all PeachCare children. It is important to note that these estimates are
consistent with the experiences of other states, where enrollment in premium assistance
programs has been generally disappointing. Pennsylvania, which has almost 3 million children,
had enrolled 21,000 members in its Medicaid Health Insurance Premium Payment (HIPP)
program as of April 20046. This is one of the highest enrollment levels of any state, while Rhode
Island’s reported enrollment of 3,500 is one of the highest in terms of the percentage of
individuals enrolled.
Coverage Expansion
We also anticipate an expansion of private coverage to parents of PeachCare children through
such a program. Based on data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for Georgia, we
estimate that more than half of the children enrolled in PeachCare have at least one family
member lacking coverage and that the total number of uninsured family members of PeachCare
enrollees is 80 percent of enrolled children . We anticipate that children in families with an
uninsured family member would comprise many of the families opting for premium assistance.
Therefore, the state would likely reduce the number of currently uninsured adults by one
individual per child enrolled in a premium assistance program.
Crowd Out (or “Crowd In”)
There is a generally accepted belief that private coverage is more valuable than public coverage
to those seeking health insurance. Therefore, if the state were to make premium assistance
available to low income workers with privately insured children, it is likely that a significant
number of workers currently paying for family coverage would take advantage of the subsidy.
This is commonly referred to as ‘crowd out’ of private insurance. In this instance it does not
result in fewer privately insured individuals but rather a shift in the financing of their coverage to
the state (if allowed). Therefore, we use the term “crowd in” because the individuals are covered
in the private sector, but have accessed that coverage using some public dollars. Furthermore,
some of the workers with uninsured children who are not enrolled in PeachCare but who have
access to ESI in the private sector would apply for the premium assistance program. This “crowd
in” would substantially increase the cost of the premium assistance program.
The table below describes the healthcare coverage status of children in Georgia living in families
with incomes under 235 percent of the FPL but above the Medicaid eligibility limits based on
their age by the work status of the parent reporting the greatest annual earnings (the family head).

6

“Pennsylvania: Health Insurance Premium Assistance Program,” The Commonwealth Fund,
http://www.cmwf.org/tools/tools_show.htm?doc_id=235063
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Table 16
Coverage Status of PeachCare Eligible Children by Work Status of Family Head
PeachCare Eligible Children
Parental Work Status
Total
Total Children
Private Coverage
Employer Coverage
Public Coverage
Uninsured

626,046
364,332
344,203
223,585
102,213

Part-Time,
Full-Time, Full
Part-Year or
Year Worker
Non-Worker
530,260
324,916
309,903
172,082
86,236

95,786
39,416
34,300
51,503
15,977

Of these children, about 86,000 are uninsured but living in a family with a full-time, full-year
worker. If eligibility for ESI for these 86,000 children mirrors that of PeachCare children, just
about half would be eligible for coverage and, therefore, candidates for participation in a
premium assistance program. We estimate that take up among this group would be lower than
the rates for current PeachCare enrollees, as these families have already opted not to enroll in the
lower cost PeachCare program. Nonetheless, between 1,000 and 5,000 of these children would
potentially participate in a premium assistance program. It is important to note that these newly
covered children should not be considered under “crowd in” if they were previously eligible but
not enrolled in PeachCare.
The larger potential problem with crowd in will arise from the almost 350,000 children in this
income bracket who are already participating in ESI without any premium assistance.
Depending upon program design, it is likely that some number of the parents of these children
would accommodate any programmatic stipulations in order to take advantage of the premium
assistance, especially if doing so would enable their children to maintain current coverage at
significantly lower rates. LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) estimate crowd-out of private
coverage because of S-CHIP to be as high as 50 percent. On the other hand, individual states
have reported substantially lower estimates of crowd out between 5 and 7 percent.7 There are no
known estimates of the levels of “crowd in” associated specifically with a premium assistance
program. Given the 6 month waiting period for eligibility and the existing stability of PeachCare,
it is probable that crowd-out of 50 percent as found by LoSasso and Buchmueller is higher than
expected..
We consider the experience of Rhode Island’s Rite Share program, which has no requirement for
a period without coverage prior to eligibility for premium assistance. After 3 years, the total
enrollment in Rite Share is about 6,000 enrollees, of which about 4,000 are children. If we
consider all of the potentially eligible children in Rhode Island with incomes under 250 percent
of FPL, (approximately 104,000 children), about 49,000 were covered under employer plans
(average for 2001-2003, Current Population Survey). The 4,000 enrollees reflect 3.9 percent of
the potentially income eligible population and 8 percent of those with private coverage during
7

See the report on crowd out found at http://www.ahrq.gov/chip/content/crowd_out/recentdev.htm.
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that time period. Even if we make the unlikely assumption that all of the enrolled children are
from previously covered families (crowd-in), this would imply maximum crowd-in of 8 percent
after 3 years8. Therefore, after adjusting for differences in the private coverage market, work
status, and firm size of Georgia families compared to Rhode Island families, we estimate as an
upper bound that crowd-in after 3 years might reach 28,000 children (8 percent of the children
currently covered through ESI). These additional covered children would impose a cost of
approximately 11 million state dollars (37 million total dollars). Given that the reported Rite
Share enrollment is largely from previously covered children, these estimates should be seen as
an upper bound of the 3 year crowd in potential. If the state maintains a 6 month waiting period
for eligibility, crowd in and the associated costs would likely be substantially below this estimate.
Policy Options and Policy Goals
Under Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) waivers, states have substantial
latitude in designing a premium assistance program. Even in the absence of a HIFA waiver,
SCHIP provisions allow for coordination with private coverage, although the coordination and
cost-effectiveness requirements are more restrictive than under HIFA. In order to understand the
rationale and impact of policy options that accompany a premium assistance program, whether
under HIFA or as a component of SCHIP, we draw on the reported experience of other states and
consider those experiences in light of the health insurance sector in Georgia in the section
below.9
Mandatory versus Optional Premium Assistance
We have modeled a voluntary system with a premium subsidy that is based on the PMPM for
public coverage. As noted by Neuschler and Curtis (2003), this “voluntary approach would be in
compliance with federal requirements for premium assistance under SCHIP, because the
additional premium the worker has to pay to enroll all family members in their employer’s plan
would not …count towards the five percent of the income cumulative limit on cost-sharing on
behalf of children.” The take-up rates estimated in this report, however, particularly under the
inelastic demand assumptions supported by recent literature, are quite low.
Some states with premium assistance programs have approached this obstacle through a
mandatory enrollment process.
Iowa, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin all mandate enrollment in ESI using premium
assistance as the only publicly subsidized coverage options for eligible enrollees under some
circumstances. For example, Wisconsin has stipulated that income eligible applicants for
BadgerCare with eligibility for ESI must participate in the private plan rather than enroll in
public coverage if their employer pays 80 percent of the premium for family coverage. If the
employer pays less than 80 percent of the family premium, premium assistance dollars are used
to supplement employee contributions so that the net cost of coverage to the employee is no
more than 20 percent of the cost of the plan. Similarly, Iowa has required applicants for public
8

In an analysis of Rite Share for the state of Connecticut, Robin Cohen reports that in fact most of the 5,100
enrollees are previous Rite Care enrollees and hence not individuals previously covered under ESI. For further
details see http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0377.htm.
9
This section draws heavily on reports by Ed Neuschler and Rick Curtis, “Premium Assistance: What Works?
What Doesn’t?” (Institute for Health Policy Solutions, April 2003) and by Claudia Williams, “A Snapshot of State
Experiences Implementing Premium Assistance Programs,” (National Academy for State Health Policy, April 2003).
These reports provide more exhaustive treatment of the questions raised briefly in this section.

17

coverage to provide verification from their employer of both wages and the availability and
contribution requirements for private coverage.
Implementation of a mandatory program creates a host of secondary policy considerations,
including:
□
□
□
□
□

Determining the characteristics of a plans that will qualify it for mandated coverage
through ESI rather than PeachCare,
Administrative questions about how to verify employer plan characteristics and
contribution levels,
Potential ERISA limitations on the state’s ability to compel employers to provide
information regarding employee benefits,
Establishing a process for eligibility determination and enrollment that manages the time
consuming process of verification of information regarding ESI,
Ensuring through state regulation that qualification for public coverage is considered a
“qualifying event” for fully insured plans so that workers can enroll without waiting for
the next open enrollment period.

Although we estimate that as many as 49 percent of current PeachCare enrollees may be eligible
for an employer-sponsored plan, under a mandatory enrollment requirement not all of these
individuals could be shifted into private plans. Mandatory enrollment would be limited based on
specifications regarding the level of employer contribution to family coverage, the benefit design,
and cost sharing requirements. Certainly not all of the plans to which these families would have
access would qualify for mandatory enrollment. For example, Wisconsin’s plan was to
supplement employer paid premiums that were at least 60 percent of the cost of family coverage
up to a maximum of 80 percent of the cost of family coverage. While 50,000 applications for
premium assistance payments for ESI were processed, only 109 plans qualified for premium
assistance. This was because 25 percent of the applicants had changed jobs since the original
application, many were ineligible for the offered coverage, and others worked for employers that
contributed less than the required 60 percent of the family premium.10 In response, Wisconsin
has recently reduced the required contribution for family coverage to 40 percent in an effort to
increase plan eligibility and enrollment.
The table below identifies several states that have made enrollment in available employer
coverage mandatory as the only possible source of public assistance for at least some group of
qualified recipients and provides details on policy and estimated eligibility.
Using the reported enrollment in each state as a share of the number of children in the incomeeligible population with likely access to coverage, we estimate potential enrollment for Georgia.
We adjust for differences in the work status of parents of Georgia’s children compared to the
reference state (share of parents working full time and firm size) and make the assumption that
the program would be administered in the same way as the reference state.

10

Williams, Claudia. “A Snapshot of State Experiences Implementing Premium Assistance Programs,” (National
Academy for State Health Policy, April 2003).
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Table 17
Estimates of Mandatory Enrollment
Massachusetts

Rhode
Island

Oregon

Wisconsin

Number of Lives Covered under
Premium Assistance Program
(12/31/03)11

2,693 (SCHIP)

4,000
(children out
of 6,000 total
individuals)

6,800

<200

Child Eligibility Level for
Programs
(%FPL)

150% - 200%

<250%

<185% (adults
and children)

<185% (initial)
<200% continuing

>150% FPL:
Adults $25-$50
Children $10$30

$61-$92 if
>150% FPL

$6 to 50% of
premium

$30-$165 if
>150% FPL

114,686

104,101

353,665
(children only)

453,723

Enrolled as share of eligible

2.35%

3.8%

1.93%

.04%

Enrolled as share of income eligible
with at least one parent employed
full time at a firm with 25 or more
employees
Estimate: Potential Covered Lives
adjusted for work status of parents

3.62%

8.8%

5.66%

0.12%

11,679

20,285

18,250

400

Enrollee Premium for Public
Program and PA
Estimated income-eligible children
(2002-2004 Current Population
Survey)

Given a program that would mirror Rhode Island’s Rite Share, we estimate a potential
enrollment of almost 21 thousand for a mandatory premium assistance program, an estimate that
is slightly lower than our point-estimate (almost 26,000) for a voluntary program. The estimates
based on every other state’s experience are far less optimistic. However, it is important to note
that many of these S-CHIP or HIFA Waiver based programs are still relatively new, and
enrollment may grow over the coming years.
Qualifying Plans and Supplementation of Benefits
Under SCHIP qualified programs, benefit design must meet a specific benchmark or a benefit
wrap-around must be provided for qualified children. However, under HIFA, states are only
required to verify that optional and expansion populations have coverage for primary care.
Similarly, cost sharing for programs administered under SCHIP is limited to five percent of
family income, while HIFA allows for some flexibility but maintains the five percent limit on
cost sharing for children. Therefore, the state would need to determine whether to supplement
coverage based on benefits, cost sharing, both, or neither. Failure to supplement at all would
reduce the number of families that would qualify for premium assistance because plans would
have to meet some benchmark for cost sharing and benefit design. On the other hand,
supplementation can be administratively cumbersome. Furthermore, supplementation can work
hand in hand with “crowd out” strategies to further erode equity between similarly situated
11

Enrollment numbers are from the National Association of State Health Policy Premium Assistance Toolbox,
Table 2 (http://www.nashp.org/_docdisp_page.cfm?LID=8535A94A-0EDF-448C-BBBA6BF6CB7AAD49).
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families. Maryland and Oregon are examples of states that have opted to benchmark the plans
and forgo supplementation. Iowa, Wisconsin and Texas are states that use the Medicaid fee-forservice system to administer supplementation of the private plan.
Several states have established minimum employer contribution levels to determine plan
qualification, consistent with the SCHIP requirement that the employer contribution be at least
60 percent of the total cost of a family plan. This requirement is waived under HIFA and can be
modified under certain circumstances under SCHIP. Massachusetts only requires a 50 percent
employer contribution, as does New Jersey. Wisconsin’s minimum contribution level is only 40
percent, while Maryland’s is only 30 percent. Rhode Island has no minimum contribution level.
Average employer contributions in Georgia are only 52 percent of the cost of family coverage,
and the trend toward reducing employer contributions for family coverage appears to be
worsening. Based on the surveys of Georgia employers conducted in 2002 and 2004, employer
share of premiums for family coverage fell from 61 percent in 2002 to 52 percent in 2004.
Establishing a minimum employer contribution for family coverage above 50 percent would
substantially reduce the number of eligible families identified in this report. However, providing
premium assistance in the absence of a substantial employer contribution for the plan will make
it difficult, if not impossible, to meet the cost effectiveness requirements under SCHIP or the
more lenient requirements under HIFA.
Determining Level of Premium Assistance
In order to establish a cost-neutral base line for estimating potential enrollment in a Premium
Assistance Program, we have linked premium assistance available to each family to the PMPM
rate, and thus to the number of children in each family. As employee contributions for family
coverage rarely fluctuate with the number of children enrolled, this assumption reduces
substantially the potential take up among small families and enhances the likely take up among
families with multiple children enrolled in PeachCare. Other states have tied premium assistance
to a share of the required contribution and family income. For example, in Wisconsin, premium
assistance is available to qualified families as needed to reduce the required employee
contribution for ESI to 20 percent of the total premium.
As noted above, Georgia employers contribute an average of 52 percent of the total cost of
almost $800 for family coverage, while employee contributions average $382 per month. In
order to achieve the maximum 20 percent contribution level, PeachCare families would require
an average monthly contribution of $223, or the approximate per-member per-month cost for a
family with two children. Thus, for families with fewer than two children (30 percent of
families), net PeachCare costs to the state would actually increase relative to the current program
design. Under SCHIP, cost effectiveness can be measured on an individual or aggregate basis, so
establishing contributions independent of family size would require measurement of cost
effectiveness in the aggregate or administration of the program under a HIFA waiver.
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Crowd Out
States take radically different approaches to the problem of crowd out. If the policy goal is to
support ESI and provide a mechanism for leveraging public dollars to gain employer
contributions to coverage, then enrollment in a premium assistance program by workers who
would not otherwise take advantage of public programs for their children is not seen as a
problem. For example, Rhode Island has no exclusionary or waiting period. Any qualified
applicant can receive premium assistance under the Rite Share program as long as they were not
covered at the time of application, and Iowa and Massachusetts permit those with current group
health coverage to participate if income-qualified.
On the other hand, states that view cost neutrality as a primary policy goal have implemented
rather rigid crowd out prevention strategies. Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin
require that applicants must have been uninsured for at least six months in order to participate in
the premium assistance program. Our estimate crowd out is based on Rhode Island’s experience
with no elimination period for eligibility. Maintaining Georgia’s current elimination period
would likely reduce crowd out from our estimate.
Administrative Issues
The success of a premium assistance program and the effect on the labor market for low-wage
workers will be dependent, in part, on the administration of this program. A consensus seems to
be building that employers cannot be expected to provide administrative support to such a
program; for example, Rhode Island has switched from paying subsidies directly to employers to
making the payments to employees. The following table summarizes some of the policy tradeoffs that have been discussed and their implications for program design.
Table 18: Policy Goals and Implications for Program Design
Policy Goal
Minimize cost

Shore up ESI

Reduce the number of uninsured

Implications
Minimize “crowd in” through waiting periods
Low enrollment when subsidies are capped on a PMPM basis - voluntary
program
Some increased financial burden for families- mandatory program
Accept some crowd in
Higher subsidies for small families - voluntary program
Mandatory enrollment for as many as possible with wrap around benefits for
mandatory populations
Accept some crowd in
Higher subsidies for small families - voluntary program

Maintenance of benefits for enrollees Wrap around benefits to ensure no increase in financial burden
Voluntary program preferable because of high turnover among the working
Single source of continuous coverage parents of this population
Increase self-sufficiency

Mandatory program with some increased financial burden for families

Promote job stability

Voluntary program with adequate subsidies for all families
Voluntary program for expansion populations only to avoid wrap-around
Simplicity of administration for state benefit
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Policy Goal

Implications

Simplicity of administration for
employers

Shift burden of plan verification and enrollment to employees

Simplicity of administration for
Shift burden of plan verification and enrollment processing to employers
enrollees
(ERISA implications)
Reduce stigma associated with public
Accept some crowd in
programs

Dynamics of Employer Sponsored Insurance
Premium Increases
Premiums in the employer sponsored market have been increasing at double digit rates for the
past few years. In Georgia, our survey demonstrated two successive years of premium growth of
about 12 percent. While some analysts predict a slight slowing of that trend in the next year or
two, it is nonetheless true that the cost of private coverage will grow faster than inflation, and
likely faster than the cost of public coverage. Furthermore, employers have increased the
contributions required for family coverage at a rate substantially higher than the rate of increase
for the total premium. If this trend continues, then the take up rates under a voluntary program
would likely decrease. Alternatively, the premium subsidy necessary to achieve enrollment
targets under a mandatory program would necessarily increase. Thus, the estimates provided in
this report should be seen as point in time estimates in a market that is dynamic.
Employer Response to Premium Assistance
None of the premium assistance programs have been in existence long enough to provide solid
evidence of the response of employers to public funding of employee contributions to the
premiums. If employers structure employee contributions in an attempt to sort workers into
compensation groups based on their preference for coverage, such subsidies will distort that
sorting. In the long run, employers will respond to the subsidies in order to minimize total
compensation for each group of workers. However, the nature of that response is not yet known.
Premium assistance would be one among many market forces influencing the choices of
employers, and close monitoring of trends in the employer market would be required to
anticipate any funding or administrative changes that would be necessary to continue a premium
assistance program in such a dynamic environment.
Conclusions
The potential for premium assistance programs to simultaneously shore up the employersponsored market, provide a single source of continuous coverage for low and moderate income
families, save the state (and federal government) money, and reduce the number of uninsured is
limited. Each of these policy goals might be achievable through a premium assistance program,
but not all of them would be simultaneously achievable, as each goal has different implications
for how such a program would be designed and implemented. For example, a program designed
to expand and strengthen the employer sponsored market will be less concerned about the
increased cost associated with crowd-out, while a program designed to reduce overall cost must
take a more rigorous approach to eligibility design in order to control crowd out. Before forging
ahead with such a program, the state would need to prioritize these goals so that the design and
administration would reflect the priorities of policymakers.
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